

MASS SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

The literature on democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe focused mainly on the institutional aspects of this process or on the processes of elite interaction, while analyses of mass support for political and economic reforms were less frequently conducted. Moreover, with few exceptions, those that studied post-communist transition from the culturalist approach analyzed the political culture of the new democracies at the beginning of transition, especially in the former USSR and in Central European countries. In this paper, using survey data from 12 countries in Central and Eastern Europe in 1999 and 1995-97, I reconsider the mass support for political and economic reforms during the phase of democratic consolidation. My analysis addresses thus an under-explored area of the democratization literature in post-communist countries. The results indicate that people report differently to political and economic reforms. The analysis of support for economic reforms shows that the market economy is a rather divisive issue in the post-communist societies. The importance of the evaluation of the communist regime in determining support for both types of reform indicates that the citizens still assess the new regime by comparison to the communist regime.

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The beginning of the 1990s marked the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).¹ The countries of this region started a complex transition: it was not only a political reform as in the case of the Latin American transitions to democracy; it was rather a holistic reform, a radical social change. The CEE countries had to structurally change all areas of the society: political, economic, and social. The most important factor that increased the difficulty of performing simultaneous changes in all these areas was represented by the “dilemma of simultaneity” (Offe, 1996: 35): market economy and democracy have never been established simultaneously (Pickel and Wiesenthal, 1997). Successfully completing the changes in all these areas is of tremendous importance because “democracy has endured only in countries with a predominantly market-economy; and it has never endured in a country with a predominantly non-market economy” (Dahl, 1998: 166).

Most of the scholars studying the transition of the post-communist societies placed at the center of their analyses either the process of institutional change or the interactions between political elites (Diamond, 1997). Less attention was given, however, to another dimension of transition, which also plays an important role: the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the people (Diamond, 1999). This often ignored dimension represents the political culture², a factor that has the ability to increase the chances that democracy will work (Almond and Verba, 1963). Democratic institutions

¹ I would like to thank Lee Ann Banaszak, Michael Bernhard, Gretchen Casper, Suzanna DeBoef, and Paula Tufis for their generous help and advice.

² Somers (1995) provides an extensive discussion of the past, present, and future of the concept of political culture.

are easy to create, but they cannot function in a hostile environment: “If democracy and capitalism are to take root in the former communist states, it is necessary not only to create the institutions and processes intrinsic to those systems, but also to foster popular attitudes that are accepting and supporting of them. This is particularly true of democracy, which by its nature is based on popular participation” (Mason and Kluegel, 2000: 11). Popular support is necessary for the institutions to play their role in society: “just as macro-economic theories have no relevance to everyday life if they cannot be related to micro-economic activities of individuals, so constitutional forms are lifeless or irrelevant if they do not have the support of the people” (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998: 8).

This paper explores the values and attitudes of the post-communist citizens regarding the political and economic reforms that are required for the transformation of an authoritarian political system into a democratic one and for the replacement of the highly centralized state-economy with a market economy. While most of the previous studies have focused on this issue in the period of transition to democracy, I analyze here the mass public support for these reforms and its determinants in what could be labeled as the stage of democratic consolidation, not taking into account the attitudes and the behavior of the political elites.

Although there is still disagreement with respect to the best indicators for the end of the transition and the beginning of the consolidation stage,³ one of the most used indicators is the survival of the democratic regime following two successive changes in government through electoral means (Huntington, 1991). By 1999 most of the twelve

³ For an extensive discussion of the concept of democratic consolidation see Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela (1992), Plasser, Ulram, and Waldrauch (1998) or Schedler (2001). For an overview of studies of democratic consolidation see Munck (2001).

countries in the sample have already had two peaceful changes in government or they were about to experience the second change in a short period of time. Gasiorowski and Power (1998) propose a different measure based on their empirical finding that “breakdown is much less likely to occur after a democratic regime has endured for 12 years” (Gasiorowski and Power, 1998: 747).

The main reason for excluding the political elites from analysis and focusing instead on the mass public is related to the distinction between democratic transition and democratic consolidation. It was often argued that the role of the elites is extremely important during the transition phase (Higley and Burton, 1989; Przeworski, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Although the elites still play an important role in the consolidation of democracy⁴, once free elections have become widely accepted, the masses control the access of the elites to the positions that give them the possibility to design and apply the reforms and influence their outcomes. A reform oriented public will vote for political actors with similar preferences, while a public that opposes reforms will vote for political actors less interested in implementing political and economic reforms. I consider this relationship to be generally true, even though the mass control over the political elites is still far from perfect.

One could argue that during their mandate the political elites are less responsible to the public. This may be true, but this problem is caused mainly by “the thorniest and most problematical aspect of the post-communist condition, the state of civil society” (Schopflin, 1991: 240). The communist regime harshly repressed any attempts to organize a civil society. As a result, at the mass level the transition to

⁴ For an analysis of the role of political elites in post-communist Europe, see the volume edited by Higley, Pakulski, and Wesołowski (1998).

democracy also implied creating a civil society from scratch, while attempting to override the culture of interpersonal distrust nurtured by the communist rule, a project that needs time to be successful. Despite the lack of effective tools to influence the political elites between elections, I consider that both the citizens and the political actors have learned (or at least accepted) the rules of the game and that regular elections are a significant mechanism of translating the public's preferences to the decision level.

This paper thus seeks the answers to a series of interrelated questions: What are the determinants of mass support for political and economic reforms during democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern European countries? Are the mechanisms of support for political and economic reform different or are they the same? Are the mechanisms of support the same in all CEE countries? Do the mechanisms of support remain constant over time or do they change?

PREVIOUS STUDIES

The fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe generated a vast interest for the future development of democracy in this region. Although most of the authors focused on the institutional aspect of the transition, several studies employed a culturalist approach in the study of post-communist democratization.

The first major line of research in this literature started with Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), who analyzed mass support for reforms in USSR, using data from a survey conducted in 1989. They used the perception of responsibility for the individuals' well-being as an indicator of support for economic reform, while their measure of support for political reform was an index that included attitudes toward competitive elections, income differences, free speech versus order, the pace of the

reforms, and protest methods. They argued that “the differential support for the various components of perestroika and the negative relationship between locus of responsibility and the other items suggest that a one-item measure of ‘support for perestroika’ would be quite difficult to interpret meaningfully” (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992: 861) and that support for political reforms and support for economic reforms are two uncorrelated dimensions. Using the same predictors for both types of support they found a significant negative effect of education on support for economic reforms, while gender and income seemed not to have any effect on the level of support for economic reform. Education, gender, and income had significant positive effects on support for political change.

Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994) extended Finifter and Mickiewicz’ analysis using survey data from Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. They found evidence supporting some of the conclusions of the previous study but, with respect to education, gender, and income, their findings contradict Finifter and Mickiewicz. All three variables have a significant effect on the level of support for reforms. Moreover, education has a significant positive effect, not negative as Finifter and Mickiewicz argued. The sign of the education coefficient was consistent with theoretical expectations and with other empirical findings (Silver, 1987; Duch, 1993).

In the second round of this debate, Finifter (1996) used data from the 1990-91 World Values Survey for 40 countries to provide additional support for her initial finding of a negative effect of education on support for economic reform and concluded that such an effect was possible given that “in 23 of the 40 societies there is *no relationship at all*, results are mixed in four countries [...] twelve countries register

significant positive relationships” (Finifter, 1996: 140). Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli (1996) responded by arguing that a reversal of the effect of education was not possible over a very short period of time: “there may have been a period in Soviet society when a negative correlation existed, but we believe that this correlation began to reverse long before the fall of the USSR” (Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli, 1996: 155). Their argument of a gradual change is supported by Bahry (1993) who argued that “political liberalization and economic reform did have mass support in 1985, but the demand for change dated at least back to the post-War years” (Bahry, 1993: 549).

The results of the studies of Finifter and Mickiewicz and Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger, however, are not fully comparable: they used different samples and, more importantly, the operationalization of the dependent variables was significantly different. Miller, Hesli and Reisinger used different indexes of support for political reform and support for economic reform as their dependent variables, both containing indicators that Finifter and Mickiewicz included in their index of support for political reform, making impossible any direct comparison of the results of these studies.

In yet another study, Gibson (1996) found that “attitudes toward the market and toward democracy are moderately interrelated [...] but the interrelationship is not overwhelmingly strong” (Gibson, 1996: 980). Using panel data (1990 and 1992) for Russia and Ukraine, he also found that attitudes toward political change remained stable, while attitudes toward economic reform changed significantly, a process he interprets as the crystallization of the attitudinal system. Attitudinal change was extremely rapid, so that the Finifter and Miller teams might have portrayed an accurate description of the reality at the moment their studies were conducted.

Whitefield and Evans (1994), analyzing the Russian elections of 1993, offer additional support for some of Gibson's findings. Attitudes toward political change and attitudes toward economic change had different trajectories among the Russians: "the transition experience itself has reoriented public opinion away from utopian expectations about the market and democracy, which were characteristic of the period when the old system was collapsing, toward a more informed and certainly more cautious outlook" (Whitefield and Evans, 1994: 58).

Other analyses approached these issues from different perspectives: Pacek (1994) analyzed national elections in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland between 1990 and 1992 and found evidence that evaluations of economic performance have an important role in determining the electoral outcome, unsatisfied voters being more likely to support both mainstream and extremist challengers. McDonough (1995) emphasizes the features of issues over the characteristics of individuals in nine Central and Eastern European countries and Spain. He distinguishes between identity issues, ideological issues, and interest cleavages and analyzes their effects on the process of democratization, concluding: "the persistence of ideological and identity cleavages and the polarization associated with them jeopardize governability" (McDonough, 1995: 670).

The second major line of research employed a different approach, focusing on the processes of support for political and economic reforms not only in the former USSR but also in Central and Eastern Europe. Most of the analyses in this category use data from the New Democracies Barometer, organized by the Paul Lazarsfeld Society.⁵

⁵ For a description of this project, see the web-site of the Center for the Study of Public Policy: <http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/>

Rose and Mishler (1994), using data from the first wave (1991) of the NDB⁶ in five CEE countries, found significant differences between support for political reform and economic reform, but they concluded that economic improvements will most likely close the gap between the two types of support. Their conclusion was rather optimistic: “the current level of support is very high, and there is momentum among both laggards and leaders to push it higher still in the next few years” (Rose and Mishler, 1994: 182). Analyzing data from 1993 in a larger sample (seven CEE countries plus Ukraine and Belarus), Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) extended their initial analysis. Evaluation of the communist regime appeared in their analyses as a significant predictor for both support for democracy and support for the current regime: “the past can remain salient as long as a new regime is still struggling to become a complete democracy and can successfully blame persisting problems on its communist legacy” (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998: 207). Evans and Whitefield (1995) offer a similar argument: “so long as democracy remains an ideal to be implemented, and while the old regime remains in the public’s memory, very high levels of democratic commitment are likely” (Evans and Whitefield, 1995: 508). It follows from these arguments that the evaluation of the communist regimes should lose its influence on the levels of support for democracy once democracy is consolidated (I will return to this issue later in the paper).

Most of the previous studies share a series of common characteristics: they analyze the support for reform during the first years of transition to democracy. Whitefield and Evans (2001) suggest that in these cases “some caution must be used in interpretation of data, particularly with respect to the extent to which given states have

⁶ Haerpfer (2002) provides the most recent analysis of NDB data from 1991 to 1998 in 15 Central and Eastern European countries.

moved beyond the communist legacy at this time” (Whitefield and Evans, 2001: 235). By focusing on these relationships during democratic consolidation, a qualitatively different stage of transition, the results that I present should be more stable, because the political systems are closer to equilibrium than during the initial stages of the transition process.

These studies also focus mainly on (former) USSR and/or countries from Central Europe. The usual approach, however, was to pool all the respondents into a single dataset and (eventually) include dummy-variables to account for country-specific differences. This approach is based on the rather strong assumption that the structure of support for democracy and market economy is homogenous across all countries included in analysis. One way to eliminate this assumption would be to include interaction terms between the dummy variables and other predictors for specific countries, based on previous theoretical expectations. The downside of this solution is that it will quickly multiply the number of coefficients that have to be estimated and it will increase the multicollinearity problems. The approach that I employ in this paper is to estimate the models separately for each country and then group the countries according to the clusters of significant predictors (the downside here is that the result tables get really messy). Next I present the data that I use.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA

I use survey data from the *European Values Survey* (EVS) project, which was conducted in 1999 in more than twenty European countries, and from the 1995-1997 wave of the *World Values Survey* (WVS). My sample consists of 12 countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,

Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. This sample represents a significant proportion of the European post-communist countries, excluding only Hungary, Belarus, Moldova, and Albania, countries for which data are not available, and the former republics of Yugoslavia that were still experiencing civil turmoil. In each country the survey was applied on a sample representative at the national level.⁷

The main advantage of using these data consists of the fact that the same questionnaire was used in all countries. Since the items of interest have been applied in all countries, this allows for testing the same model. The disadvantages of this research design are those commonly encountered when using survey data. First, secondary analysis of data collected in 12 countries does not offer an exact approximation of the reliability of the data. However, since the project was coordinated by the same team of principal investigators who verified the correct application of the protocols in all countries, I believe that there are only minimal problems regarding data reliability. Second, it is also a commonly accepted fact that survey data are not suitable for assessing causal relationships empirically. This problem is minimized by the fact that most of the causal relationships that I test have a strong theoretical background. Finally, using already collected data, my analysis is restricted to the items available in the questionnaire. I suspect, however, that this restriction is not very problematic because most of the variables used in previous studies are available in these datasets as well.

Another important problem in the analysis of survey data is the existence of non-responses in the dataset. The treatment of the missing values may have significant effects on the inferences drawn from the results, ranging from incorrect estimates to

⁷ More detailed descriptions of the two projects are available on their web pages: www.europeanvalues.nl for the European Values Survey and wvs.isr.umich.edu for the World Values Survey.

selection bias. All opinion items that I use in analysis had missing values. In order to solve this problem, rather than using the “standard” approach when dealing with missing values (i.e. filling some of the missing values through educated guesses then using listwise deletion), I used the software developed by Honaker et al. 1999, *Amelia: A Program for Missing Data*.⁸ For the items included in analysis I assume that the missing values are *missing at random* (MAR) i.e. they can be predicted using other variables in the dataset. Following the suggestion of King et al (2001) I included more information in the imputation process (i.e. variables that are not used in analysis later) in order to make the MAR assumption more realistic.

The main advantages of using this algorithm for estimating the missing values consist of eliminating an important source of bias – “the threats to the validity of inferences from listwise deletion are of roughly the same magnitude as those from the much better known problems of omitted variable bias” (King et al., 2001: 65) – and using all the information available in the dataset. For each missing value I used five estimations. The results of the analyses were aggregated using the *Clarify* procedure developed by Tomz, Wittenberg, and King (2003) for Stata⁹. As a result of estimating the values of the missing data, I am more confident that the results of my analysis correctly describe the true relationships that exist in the population. Next, I present the model that I use in analysis and the operationalization of support for political and economic reforms.

⁸ For a description of *Amelia* and for a detailed discussion of the disadvantages of listwise deletion compared to the advantages of using multiple imputation methods, see King et al. (2001). In this article King et al also replicate two studies using *Amelia* and show that the simple deletion of the missing data leads the researcher to biased conclusions.

⁹ For a description of *Clarify*, see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).

THEORETICAL MODEL AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS

The focus of this paper is on the structure of attitudes toward political and economic reforms in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. As I have argued before, most of the previous analyses were performed at the beginning of the transition to democracy. The models that were used in these analyses have been useful for explaining the levels of support at that particular moment in time, but whether they are still able to adequately describe the same phenomenon during the consolidation of democracy is a question that requires further analysis.

Soon after the fall of the communist regimes the people faced a new reality, characterized by tumultuous changes. For the vast majority of the citizens of the post-communist countries this was the first time when they experienced democracy and a market economy directly (even if these were only in the incipient stages). As these new stimuli reached the people, they had to develop attitudes toward them. It is very likely that the novelty of their experiences initially led them not to differentiate between democracy and market economy and to develop a common attitude toward both. As time passed and political and economic reforms were implemented, people experienced the effects of these reforms and they started to better understand and distinguish between them.

The reforms in the two areas had, however, different tempos. Political reforms were easier to implement because they consisted mainly of creating a new institutional structure and new rules of the game. Once the new structures and rules were established, the main challenge became maintaining and giving them substance. In the economic arena, reforms were more difficult to implement for several reasons. The

economic reforms implied negative effects on the financial situation of the citizens, making the new political elites cautious about drastic changes. The debates about the pace of economic reforms played an important role at the beginning of the transition (in some countries, e.g. Romania or Bulgaria, the debate evolved into an important cleavage). The change from a controlled to a market economy was also difficult due to the lack of a clear model of transition, unlike in the case of political reforms. As a consequence, I expect that as time passed people reconstructed their attitudinal systems and developed mechanisms of support for political and economic reforms different from the ones they developed in the initial stages of the transition to democracy. The evolution of the new democracies from the transitional phase to consolidation was mirrored thus at the individual level by the crystallization of attitudes toward different types of reform. Under this assumption, I use different measures of support for political and economic reforms¹⁰.

Support for political reforms. I operationalized this variable as normative support for democracy as a political system. This approach is similar to measures used in previous studies (Duch, 1995; Gibson, 1996; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998). The measure is a factor score¹¹ obtained by aggregating six items that use a four-point scale: three items of rejection / acceptance of undemocratic alternatives (having a

¹⁰ All the variables that I use in the analysis are described in Appendix A.

¹¹ In order to construct the factor scores I followed the same algorithm for both years and in all countries. First, I conducted a factor analysis with maximum-likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation to identify the dimensionality of the responses. In most cases the factor analysis extracted two factors, but the average correlation between the two factors was quite high (0.475 in 1999 and 0.430 in 1995-97) suggesting that a one-factor solution is acceptable. Second, I conducted reliability analyses to check internal consistency. The Cronbach-alpha coefficients justified my decision to extract only one factor since the average alpha was 0.721 in 1999 and 0.722 in 1995-97, respecting the cut-off point suggested by Carmines and Zeller (1979:51). The last step consisted of extracting one factor using principal components analysis and saving the factor scores using the regression method. The tables in Appendix B present detailed statistics for each step of the algorithm that I used.

strong leader rule the country, having the army rule the country, and having a democratic political system) and three items of negative characterization of democracy (in democracy the economic system runs badly, democracies are indecisive, and democracies are not good at maintaining order). The measure includes, as a result, two dimensions: acceptance of democracy as “the only game in town” and acceptance of democracy despite its possible problems.

Support for economic reforms. In the first stage of the analysis I tried to create a factor out of three items (10-point scales) measuring support for different defining characteristics of a market economy system: locus of responsibility, economic competition, and private ownership. The results, however, suggest that these three items do not form a single scale.¹² This is an interesting finding by itself, indicating that respondents are able to identify the different principles of a market economy and to have different attitudes toward them.

The item measuring locus of responsibility has the weakest correlations with the other two items and in a significant number of cases the correlations are not significant. In the context of the post-communist transitions the perceived locus of responsibility for economic well-being (the individual or the state) was considered as an important indicator of respondents’ orientation toward economic reform (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1994). I consider, however, that this item is capturing a different phenomenon: it is not related to attitudes toward market economy, but rather to attitudes toward the welfare system, distinguishing between people who value individualism and liberal values from people oriented toward collectivism and

¹² Using the same algorithm as before, the average Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are 0.461 for 1999 and 0.360 for 1995-97.

social-democratic values. This interpretation is a possible explanation for the weak and not significant correlations with the other two items. In the context of Roller's classification, this item measures attitudes toward the socio-economic dimension of the welfare state (Roller, 1995: 167-171).

The items related to competition and private ownership are significantly correlated in all countries with the exception of Latvia in 1999, with the correlations ranging between 0.121 and 0.439 and with an average correlation of 0.249 in 1999 and 0.244 in 1995-97. These values allow me to add the two items into an index of support for market economy.

As a result, I use three dependent variables in my analyses: support for political reforms, support for welfare system, and support for market economy. The correlation coefficients between these variables are presented in Table 1.

(Table 1 about here.)

The correlation coefficients for 1999 indicate weak to moderate associations between the attitudes toward political reform, market economy, and welfare state. In Bulgaria and the Czech Republic the attitudes toward all three objects are relatively strongly correlated to each other (the average for Bulgaria is .40 and for the Czech Republic is .36). At the other extreme, in Croatia and Slovenia the attitudes of the public are weakly correlated. In terms of the evolution from 1995-97 to 1999, the only observable trend is the increase of the correlation between the attitudes toward market economy and the welfare state (the average correlation increased from .17 to .29). Poland has a significantly different evolution from the rest of the countries included in analysis: the correlations have decreased for all possible pairs.

Independent variables. I selected the independent variables based on previous studies so that I could test three interrelated theories developed in the democratization literature and/or in the voting behavior literature. The first one is the modernity theory, which argues that during periods of societal change the highest level of support for the continuation of the reforms comes from the modernist strata of the society. These modernist strata are similar to what Miller, White, and Heywood (1998) label as vanguard groups:

“Dahl had stressed the importance of political values particularly amongst the active political stratum. Some people’s values may matter more than other’s in defining a country’s political culture. [...] The highly educated are influential either because they hold positions of power or because they contribute disproportionately towards setting the climate of opinion in which others act. Finally even if the young are not usually either active or influential in contemporary politics, and even if they are part of no contemporary ‘elite’, the future belongs to them. Together these groups might be described as vanguard groups whose values are especially important for the consolidation of any new political and economic system” (Miller, White, and Heywood, 1998: 18).

The variables used for testing this theory are gender, age, education, and town size.

The second theory comes from the voting literature and, taking into account the effect of the subjective perceptions of economy, states that in the voting booths people value either their economic situation or the economic situation of the nation.¹³ The available data allow testing the pocketbook variant of this theory, through the effect of income, unemployment, and life satisfaction.

The third theory posits a lifetime of learning model (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998), which allows for a re-socialization as a result of the recent experiences

¹³ For a detailed discussion of the sociotropic theory and of the personal experiences versus the national assessment hypotheses, see Fiorina (1981), Kiewiet (1983), and Markus (1988).

of the individual. According to this model, people's attitudes are shaped not only by their past socialization, but also by their evaluations of the past and of the present. The variables corresponding to this model are: evaluation of the communist regime, evaluation of the current regime, and satisfaction with democracy.

I also included two additional groups of variables. The first one is testing the effect of political variables: importance of politics, political participation, and left-right political orientation. The second group tests the effect of social capital on support for political reforms, market economy, and welfare system. The variables included in this group are: membership in voluntary organizations and interpersonal trust.

Gender. During the communist period gender equality was a main component of the official ideology, with important effects on women's chances on the labor market. The new regimes, however, had to face a complex situation and gender equality lost much of its importance. As a consequence, women had much more to lose than men. Coupled with the men's higher acceptance of the risk and the uncertainty associated with political and economic changes, I suspect that men are more likely to support the reforms (both political and economic). Women, on the other side, are more likely to support to a higher extent the implementation of an extensive welfare system, as a safety mechanism in response to their losses generated by the economic changes.

Thus, I expect the gender variable to have a significant positive effect on support for political reforms and on support for market economy, and a negative effect on support for welfare system. Given the low salience of gender equality in the post-communist societies, however, it is possible that gender will have only a marginal influence.

Age. Young people have more resources to successfully “survive” the transition and I expect that they will support reforms to a higher extent than older people. The elders are more likely to be among the losers of the transition. Thus, they will tend to reject more reforms. For the retired persons the situation is even more difficult, given that their income (which comes mainly from retirement benefits) decreases more rapidly than the income of the employed. Moreover, whether young people can have a second job to supplement insufficient incomes, this is impossible in the case of the retired persons. Thus, the latter are more likely to expect the state to take care of their well-being. I expect age to have a significant negative effect on all dependent variables.

Education. Highly educated people are less likely to lose during transition, they are more modern than less educated people, and they have higher resources to adapt to the new economy. According to the modernity theory, highly educated people should support political and economic reforms. Most of the literature indicates the existence of a significant positive influence of education (Silver 1987; Duch 1993; Miller, Hesli, Reisinger 1994). As a result, I expect education to have a significant positive effect on all dependent variables.

Town size. In the post-communist societies the rural areas are characterized by high levels of traditionalism. At the same time, during transition the incomes of those living in rural areas have declined more than those of the urbanites. People residing in rural area should support reforms to a lesser extent, and they should reject the idea of the individuals providing for themselves. Theoretically, town size should have significant positive effects on all three dependent variables. It is possible however that

in the countries in which poverty has affected both urban and rural areas to a similar extent this variable will not have a significant effect.

Income. This variable is usually correlated with education, so I expect that these two variables will have the same effect on support for political reforms and on support for market economy. Low income should be associated with a higher probability of supporting the implementation of an extensive welfare system.

Unemployment. This variable controls for the employment status of the respondents. Those that do not have a job might perceive their situation as the result of the economic reforms. They will also experience a decrease in income. Given all these, I expect unemployment to have a negative effect on the support for economic reforms. To the extent that the respondents distinguish political reforms from economic reforms, I expect the unemployment status to not influence support for political reforms. Unemployed persons should also perceive the state as responsible for their own well-being. The effect of this variable may be weakened by two factors. First, since this is a dichotomous variable with relatively few cases in the unemployed category, it may not have enough variation to account for a significant part of the variation. Second, its effect may be changed by the participation of the unemployed respondents in the informal economy that is widely available in most of the post-communist countries (of course, this remains just a theoretical argument, since I do not have supporting data).

Life satisfaction. This variable measures the effect of the general satisfaction of the respondents with their lives. A main component that determines the level of satisfaction is the financial situation of the individual. Thus, this variable tests the pocketbook variant of the sociotropic theory. Roller (1995: 192) considers this variable

as a measure of subjective interest orientation, as opposed to value-based orientations. Respondents that are satisfied with their lives should support to a higher extent market economy and political reforms. I also expect them to consider that each individual should be responsible for his own well-being.

Rating of current regime. This variable tests whether the national assessment hypothesis of the sociotropic theory (as developed in explaining electoral behavior) holds for support for reforms as well. Miller and Listhaug (1999: 205) argued that subjective evaluations of the performance of the regime are a critical factor in the formation of attitudes toward democracy. I expect that positive evaluations of the current regime will strengthen the support for political reforms and for market economy. Negative evaluations of the current regime should increase the support for welfare system. The rating of the current regime is also a component of the lifetime of learning model. In this case, the variable has an important role in fine-tuning previously formed attitudes, in incorporating the recent performance of the regime into the process of attitude formation. The relationships, however, should have the same signs.

Rating of communist regime. The evaluation of the communist regime may be based either on ideology or on material comparisons between the former regime and the current regime. Regardless of its sources, positive evaluations of the communist regime should generate lower levels of support for both political and economic reforms. Those that regret the regime changes based on material comparisons between the present and the past should also be more likely to consider that the state is responsible for the individuals' well-being. Previous studies (Bruszt, 1998: 177; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998: 157) support these expectations.

Satisfaction with democracy. This variable captures the effect of the respondents' satisfaction with the way democracy as a political system is developing in their countries. Satisfaction with the way democracy is developing “refers to the informal structure and measures support at a low level of generalization” (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson, 1995: 347). Unlike the variable measuring the rating of current regime, which implies an evaluation on multiple dimensions (including economic evaluation), this variable measures mainly an ideological evaluation of democracy. High levels of satisfaction with democracy should lead to higher levels of support for political reforms and, perhaps, for economic reforms. The distinction between satisfaction with democracy and support for political reforms is similar to the distinction between the current state (where democracy is now) and the ideal state (where it should be).

Importance of politics. I operationalized this variable as a factor score aggregating three items: importance of politics in the respondent's life, following politics in the media, and discussing politics with friends.¹⁴ The item measuring importance of politics “has been used in several surveys since the 1950s” (Gabriel and Van Deth, 1995: 395). The item related to the discussion of political issues with friends measures the “behavioral manifestation of interest” (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). Those interested in politics are more open receivers of information. Being more informed, they are more likely to understand the reasons why certain reforms need to be done and in understanding the reasons they are more likely to support them. Interest for politics should have a significant positive effect on all dependent variables.

¹⁴ The average Cronbach's alpha coefficients are 0.635 for 1999 and 0.759 for 1995-97. More detailed statistics are presented in Appendix B.

Political participation. There is a large literature analyzing the relationship between political participation (and, more generally, civil society) and support for democracy.¹⁵ This measure is a count of the number of political activities in which the respondent took an active role: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. The measure includes both legal and illegal behaviour. Kaase and Newton (1995) argue that such forms of direct action “have become a standard part of the citizen repertory of political behaviour in modern pluralist democracies” (Kaase and Newton, 1995: 50). Those with high levels of political participation are probably individuals with high levels of interest in politics and with higher levels of involvement. As such, this variable should have a significant positive effect on support for political reform. Its influence over the support for market economy and for the welfare system will probably be less important.

Left – right political orientations. I included this variable in analysis to account for the position of the respondent on one of the basic dimensions in the political arena. Given that the communist regimes claimed to belong to the left, I hypothesize that the closer a respondent is to the right end of the scale, the higher the support for political reform and for market economy. In the case of the support for the welfare system, the relationship should have an opposite effect. Thomassen (1995), analysing developed democracies, argues that the position on the left-right continuum has different effects depending on the type of democracy that is considered. If liberty is at the centre of the definition of democracy, then leftist issues (e.g. civil liberties, tolerance) may be important. If the definition of democracy is based on equality, then economic issues (e.g.

¹⁵ See, for instance, Weigle and Butterfield (1992), Bernhard (1993), McDonough et al. (1998).

the welfare state) become more salient. This suggests that the variable may have mixed effects, function of the idea of democracy that people have in mind.

Membership in voluntary organizations. This variable captures both the effect of civil society and the effect of the social network dimension of the concept of social capital. Both these perspectives posit a positive effect of membership in voluntary organizations on support for political reforms. The effect on the two measures of support for economic reforms should be weaker. The variable that I use is a count of the number of voluntary organizations in which the respondent is a member.

Interpersonal trust. This is another main component of the social capital dimension. Interpersonal trust is usually seen as a prerequisite for the creation of civil society and for institutional trust (Putnam, 1993; Muller and Seligson, 1994; Inglehart, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Gibson, 2001). Interpersonal trust should have a positive effect on all three dependent variables.

RESULTS

In this section I present the results of the analysis for support for political reforms, support for market economy, and support for welfare state. In presenting the results I am focusing on four main issues: the main determinants of support, differences between the mechanisms of support for the different types of reforms, differences between the mechanisms of support in different countries and over time.

Support for political reforms. This variable was operationalized as normative support for democracy as a political system. The goal of the CEE countries is to consolidate democracy and as long as their citizens support the idea of democracy, regardless of the present situation, there is a societal impetus for further consolidation.

(Table 2 about here.)

The model explains on average 25.1% of the variance in support for political reforms, ranging from a low of 9.7% in Croatia to a high of 41.0% in Bulgaria.¹⁶ I discuss first the performance of the five groups of variables.

In most countries the gender of the respondents does not have significant effects on their support for political reform. Age has a significant negative effect in only four countries (the Czech Republic, Latvia, Russia, and Romania). Education has a significant positive effect in all countries, suggesting that the more educated the citizens, the higher their support for political reforms. The findings for the town size are less clear: this variable has a significant positive effect in four countries, while in three countries the effect is negative. The different signs in Russia (positive) and Ukraine (negative) and in Estonia (negative) and Latvia (positive) attract attention because these countries are usually grouped together under the assumption that they are very similar. Overall, the modernity theory receives relatively strong empirical support.

The pocketbook hypothesis receives little support (only six out of the 36 coefficients are significant, all of them with the hypothesized signs): income is significant in three countries, unemployment in two, and life satisfaction in only one country. These results suggest that support for political reform is little influenced by the public's evaluation of their economic situation.

The lifetime of learning model has the strongest empirical support. The variable measuring the evaluation of the communist regime has a significant negative effect in all countries. Since the previous group of variables was only marginally significant, I consider that the evaluation of the communist regime is based on ideology rather than

¹⁶ Table 4 presents the levels of significance and the signs of the coefficients in an easier to read format.

on material comparisons between the past and the present. If this interpretation is correct (and taking into account the negative effect of age in some of the countries), a possible implication would be that the CEE citizens will continue to support democratic consolidation as long as they perceive democracy as morally superior to communism (and the chances of this reversal happening are rather slim). Satisfaction with the way democracy is developing has a significant positive effect in nine countries, suggesting a reinforcing effect of democracy. The evaluation of the current regime has a significant positive effect in eight countries. This finding offers support not only for the lifetime of learning model, but also for the national assessment hypothesis: people who are more satisfied with the performance of the current regime are more likely to offer greater support to political reforms.

The political variables receive moderate support. The position of the respondent on the left-right continuum is significant in six countries. It is interesting that in two countries (Croatia and Lithuania) the effect is negative, suggesting that those who have left-wing sympathies support political reform to a greater extent than those with right-wing sympathies. The effect of the social capital variables is marginal: membership in voluntary organizations is significant only in Estonia (and the sign is negative), while individual trust is significant in only four countries. I discuss next the differences and similarities in support for political reforms between the 12 countries that I analyze.

The only two variables that are significant in all countries are education and rating of communist regime. Support for political reforms is influenced primarily by variables belonging to the modernity theory, to the lifetime of learning model, and to the political variables group. Evaluation of the personal economic situation and social

capital have only a marginal contribution. The 12 countries could be grouped in different categories, depending on the groups of variables that have a significant contribution in explaining the variance of support for political reform:

- Group 1 – Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. The level of support for political reforms is influenced in this category by variables belonging to the modernity theory, to the lifetime of learning model, and to the political group. None of the variables testing the pocketbook hypothesis or the role of the civil society are significant in this group.
- Group 2 – Slovakia and Slovenia. Support for political reforms is explained in this category through the modernity theory, the lifetime of learning model, and the effect of the evaluations of one's personal economic situation. None of the political variables are significant, and the social capital group has a significant effect only in Slovenia.
- Group 3 – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Estonia. All groups of variables are significant in this category, with the exception of the pocketbook variables.
- Group 4 – Latvia, Romania, and Russia. All groups of variables are significant in this category, with the exception of the social capital groups which is significant only in Latvia.

Table 3 presents the results of the same model using the WVS (1995-97) data.¹⁷

(Table 3 about here.)

The model explains on average 20.6% of the variance in support for political reforms, ranging from a low of 12.7% in Croatia and Ukraine to a high of 38.9% in Bulgaria. Since some of the variables were not available (income in the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; town size in the Czech Republic, and membership in voluntary organizations in Poland) I do not discuss these results in detail. I am rather interested in finding significant trends. The image presented by these

¹⁷ Table 4 presents the levels of significance and the signs of the coefficients in an easier to read format.

results is, however, quite similar to the results from 1999. Education and evaluation of communist regime are the only variables that are significant in all twelve countries, while evaluation of current regime has a significant positive effect in all but one country. The lifetime of learning model and the modernity theory receive the strongest empirical support, while for the pocketbook hypothesis and for the political and social capital variables the results are mixed: they are significant only in some cases. The comparison of the results from the two datasets indicates that there are no consistent changes that characterize all countries included in analysis.

Support for market economy. Whether the levels of support for democracy are very similar throughout Central and Eastern Europe, market economy has the potential of being a more divisive issue. Different countries have had different levels of success in adopting market economy and the implementation of economic reforms has had significantly different consequences on the quality of life of their citizens.

(Table 5 about here.)

The model explains on average 14.1% of the variance in support for market economy, ranging from a low of 6.0% in Croatia to a high of 23.4% in Ukraine.¹⁸ I discuss next the five groups of variables.

With the exception of Estonia and Lithuania, in the remaining ten countries at least two variables that test the modernity theory have significant coefficients. Gender has a significant positive effect in seven countries, suggesting that men support to a higher extent than women economic reforms. Age has a significant negative effect in seven countries. Education has a significant positive effect in nine countries, while in Romania the coefficient is negative (a rather disturbing result given that my knowledge

¹⁸ Table 7 presents the levels of significance and the signs of the coefficients in an easier to read format.

of the Romanian society suggests a positive coefficient). Town size is significant in only one country. Overall, the modernity theory has strong support from the data, and the results are consistent with Miller et al's discussion of the vanguard groups.

The data also offer some support for the pocketbook hypothesis. Income has a significant positive effect on the level of support for market economy in eight countries. Unemployment is significant in only two countries. Life satisfaction has a significant positive effect, as hypothesized, but in only three countries. Although this group of variables receives some support from the data, it is still less than one would have expected.

The variables that correspond to the lifetime of learning model receive relatively strong support from the data. The evaluation of the communist regime has a significant negative effect in nine countries (and a difficult to explain positive coefficient in Croatia). The data suggest that those who remember the communist regime in positive terms are more likely to oppose further economic reforms, while the rejection of the communist regime is also associated with the rejection of the centralized economy that accompanied it. Satisfaction with the way democracy is developing is significant and positive in five countries. Interestingly, the evaluation of the current regime is significant in only three countries (including Croatia where, again, the coefficient has an unexpected negative sign).

The political variables have only a marginal role in explaining support for market economy. None of the variables in this group are significant in more than four countries. The variables in the social capital group also have a poor performance: interpersonal trust is significant in only two countries, while membership in only four.

Support for market economy is influenced by variables belonging to the modernity group, to the lifetime of learning model, and by evaluation of the personal economic situation. Political variables and social capital variables have only a marginal influence. The 12 countries group into the following five categories:

- Group 1 – the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Ukraine. The level of support for market economy is explained in this category by variables belonging to all five groups.
- Group 2 – Estonia and Russia. Support for market economy is explained in these countries by all groups with the exception of the variables testing the effect of social capital.
- Group 3 – Croatia and Slovakia. Support for market economy is explained by variables belonging to the modernity theory, the lifetime of learning model, and the evaluation of personal economic situation. Political variables and the variables in the social group are not significant in these countries.
- Group 4 – Latvia and Romania. The variance in these two countries is explained by all groups with the exception of the political variables group.
- Group 5 – Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovenia. This is rather a residual group in which the only commonality is the significant effect of variables belonging to the modernity theory and the lack of significance of variables in the social capital group. The remaining three explanatory groups are significant in at least one country from this category.

Table 6 presents the results of the same model using the WVS (1995-97) data.¹⁹

(Table 6 about here.)

The model explains on average 17.8% of the variance in support for market economy, ranging from a low of 8.8% in Slovenia to a high of 24.6% in Poland. There are several trends over time. First, while town size had a significant effect in 1995-97 in

¹⁹ Table 7 presents the levels of significance and the signs of the coefficients in an easier to read format.

five countries, by 1999 the effect of this variable has remained significant in only one country. The evaluation of current regime played a significant role in seven countries in 1995-97, while in 1999 its influence stayed significant in only one of these countries and it became significant in two more countries. Satisfaction with the way democracy is developing was not significant in 1995-97, but it became significant in five countries in 1999. Importance of politics had a significant effect in five countries in 1995-97 and by 1999 it stayed significant only in the Czech Republic. Lastly, the position of the respondent on the left-right continuum was significant in seven countries in 1995-97 and by 1999 it lost its significance in five of these and it became significant in one additional country.

Political reforms and market economy. There are significant similarities and differences between the mechanisms of support for political reforms and for market economy. In terms of changes in the structure of support over time, there is one clear difference. The determinants of support for political reform had only minor changes over time, while the determinants of support for market economy have registered significant changes for five out of the 15 variables included in analysis. This difference suggests that people's attitudes toward political reform were already in equilibrium by 1995-97, while the structure of support for market economy was still in flux, still changing. In terms of differences in the structure depending on the object of support, the modernity theory has a significant effect in both cases. The lifetime of learning model has a significant effect in both cases, but stronger in the case of support for political reform. The evaluation of the individual's economic situation has an important

role on the support for market economy, while its effect on the support for political reforms is only marginal.

Support for welfare state. The welfare state issue has both a political and an economic component. The political component distinguishes between liberal democracy and social democracy (each having its own view on the role of the state in providing for the individual's welfare). The economic component captures the distinction between the winners and the losers of the transitional process. If people consider both dimension of the welfare state issue important, I expect that their attitudes will be delimited by the attitudes toward political reform and the attitudes toward market economy.

(Table 8 about here.)

The dependent variable is measured so that low values correspond to higher levels of support for welfare state, while high values correspond to less support for welfare state. The model explains on average 11.3% of the variance in support for market economy, ranging from a low of 5.8% in Croatia to a high of 17.6% in Bulgaria.²⁰ In comparison to support for political reforms and for market economy, the model performs poorly in predicting attitudes toward welfare state.

The variables belonging to the modernity group are less significant than in the case of support for political reforms and for market economy. Gender has a significant positive effect in three countries, while age is significant only in Russia. It is interesting to note that education, which was one of the most important predictors in the previous models, loses some of its importance, having a significant effect only in half of the countries in the sample. The higher the education levels of the respondents, the lower

²⁰ Table 10 presents the levels of significance and the signs of the coefficients in an easier to read format.

their support for welfare state. Town size has a significant negative effect in five countries. Overall, the variables in this group receive moderate support from the data.

Income is the most important predictor in this model – it is significant in nine countries and it runs in the hypothesized direction: those with higher incomes tend to give less support to the implementation of an extensive welfare state. Surprisingly, unemployment is not significant in any of the countries, although unemployed persons are among those who have to benefit the most from a well developed welfare system. An alternative explanation would be that unemployment in CEE countries does not result in losing all sources of income and in having to depend on the financial support of the state. The informal economy is an important part of the economy of most of these countries. Friedman et al. (2000) estimate the size of the unofficial sector (as % of the total GDP) in CEE from a low of 5.8% in Slovakia to a high of 48.9% in Ukraine, with an average of 24.3%. Life satisfaction has a significant positive effect in seven countries. The data offer moderate to strong support that the evaluation of the individual's economic situation has a significant effect on support for welfare state.

The lifetime of learning model also receives some support from the data. Evaluation of the communist regime has a significant negative effect in nine countries, suggesting that those that evaluate positively the former regime are also more likely to support a welfare state to a higher degree. The other two variables in this group are significant and positive in half of the countries in the sample. The last two groups of variables (the political variables and the social capital group) receive little support from the data. Support for welfare state is influenced primarily by the variables belonging to the lifetime of learning model and by the evaluation of personal economic situation.

Variables belonging to the modernity group have a moderate influence, while the political variables and the social capital group have only a marginal influence.

The structure of support for welfare state is similar to the structure of support for market economy. The evaluation of the personal economic situation and the variables corresponding to the lifetime of learning model have the main role in determining support for welfare state. The variables in the modernity group are also significant, but to a lesser extent. The political variables and the social capital variables are significant only marginally.

The 12 countries in the sample group into three categories:

- Group 1 – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Russia. Support for welfare state is explained in these countries by variables belonging to all groups, excepting social capital variables, which are significant only in Russia.
- Group 2 – Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. There are only three significant groups in these countries: the modernity theory, the personal economic evaluation variables, and the lifetime of learning model.
- Group 3 – Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The countries in this category are different from the countries in the other two groups and they are also different from each other in terms of the structure of support for welfare state. They form a residual category in which different combinations of variables explain support for welfare state.

Table 9 presents the results of the same model using the WVS (1995-97) data.²¹

(Table 9 about here.)

The model explains on average 11.6% of the variance in support for market economy, ranging from a low of 5.8% in Romania to a high of 21.8% in the Czech Republic. There are very few significant changes in the structure of support for welfare

²¹ Table 10 presents the levels of significance and the signs of the coefficients in an easier to read format.

state over time. The most significant change is related to the influence of age. In 1995-97 age had a significant negative effect in seven countries, while by 1999 age remained significant only in Russia. Satisfaction with democracy gained more importance over time, becoming significant in three more countries.

Welfare state and political reforms. The lifetime of learning model has a strong effect on both types of attitudes. The variables in the modernity group, which are important in determining attitudes toward political reform also receive moderate to strong support in the model explaining attitudes toward welfare state. The last similarity is the marginal effect of variables in the social capital group on both types of attitudes. There are also two important differences: the evaluation of the personal economic situation has a significant effect on the attitudes toward welfare state, while in the case of the attitudes toward political reform the effect is only marginal. In the case of the political variables, the relationship is inversed: they are an important factor in determining support for political reform, but they have a very weak effect on support for welfare state.

Welfare state and market economy. The attitudes toward welfare state and market economy have a similar structure. The only observable difference is related to the variables belonging to the modernity theory which have a strong effect on attitudes toward market economy, while in the case of the welfare state their effect is still important, but weaker. All other groups of variables have similar effect in both cases.

CONCLUSIONS

I analyzed in this paper support for political reforms, for market economy, and for welfare state in 12 Central and Eastern European countries using survey data from 1999 and from 1995-97. I used the 1999 data to identify the structure of support and the 1995-97 data to identify the changes in the mechanisms of support over time. The goal of the analysis was to answer four interrelated questions: What are the determinants of mass support for political and economic reforms during democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern European countries? Are these mechanisms of support different or are they the same? Are the mechanisms of support the same in all CEE countries? Do the mechanisms of support remain constant over time or do they change? Based on previous studies, I included in the model five groups of variables corresponding to different theories: the modernity theory, the lifetime of learning model, variables related to the evaluation of personal economic situation, political variables, and variables related to social capital. Following the suggestions of King et al. (2001) I used multiple imputations to replace the missing values, a technique which reduces the biased results obtained by simply deleting the cases with missing values or by replacing them with the means.

Differences in the mechanisms of support for political reform, market economy, and welfare state. The variables belonging to the lifetime of learning model have a significant effect on all three types of support. The evaluation of the communist regime is the most important variable in the model for support for political reforms and for support for market economy. This result suggests that even ten years after the fall of the communist regimes, the support for reforms still has a strong reactive component,

being oriented toward the past. I believe that the mechanism that works through this variable has an ideological background, indicating a possible cleavage line between the supporters of the communist regime (or, in a less severe case, those who regret the advantages of the communist regime) and the supporters of the democratic regime. The second variable that has a strong effect in all three models is education. This result offers support for the modernity theory, which argues that as long as the modernist strata of the society support democracy and market economy, the reforms will continue to be implemented.

In addition to these two factors, the political variables play an important role in determining the level of support for political reforms. Support for market economy and support for welfare state are influenced only marginally by the political variables, but they are strongly influenced by the evaluation of the personal economic situation.

Gender, age, and income, have only a marginal effect on support for political reforms. I interpret this as evidence that political reform is not a divisive issue for the CEE societies as a whole. If both men and women, both young people and older people, both rich and poor have the same attitudes toward political change, this is a sign that democracy as a political system is accepted by all these groups to the same extent. This finding is particularly important for the future of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe if one remembers Easton's distinction between diffuse and specific support and between different objects of support (Easton, 1965). These results indicate that diffuse support for democracy, defined as a "commitment to the political system that transcends the actual behavior of government" (Dalton, 1996: 264) is not depending on traditional cleavage lines.

In the case of support for market economy, the image is more complex: gender, age, and income are all important predictors. This indicates that there is a certain lag between accepting political reforms and accepting the much more painful economic reforms, which still have a highly divisive potential. This should not be surprising, given that the economic changes have a higher potential of generating negative changes in the economic situations of some groups. Whether political reforms create only winners, economic reforms create both winners and losers. Lipset's warning regarding the importance of accepting economic reforms remains valid during democratic consolidation as well: "the success of democracies in these countries depends in large part on their populations' willingness to accept the cyclical nature of the free market system, and, of course, on successful economic performance" (Lipset, 1993: 13).

Summing up, the modernity theory and the lifetime of learning model influence support for any type of reforms. Differentiated support depends on the object of support: the attitudes toward political reform are also influenced by political variables, while the attitudes toward economic reforms (i.e. market economy and welfare state) are also influenced by economic variables.

Differences between countries. The results indicate that there are significant differences in the ways citizens from different countries relate to political reforms, market economy, and welfare state. The Central and Eastern European post-communist countries form different clusters depending on their citizens' attitudes toward reforms. The results suggest that the "traditional" approach to the study of post-communist transitions, i.e. considering that the region is quite homogenous, might be incorrect. From the perspective of the public, there does not exist one post-communism, but rather

different variations on the same theme. It also seems that geographically defined sub-groups (e.g. the Baltic States, Central Europe, or Eastern Europe), although having support from macro-economic indicators, are irrelevant if the classification is based on the attitudes of the public: Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland are never in the same group; the same is true for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The success of the transition phase does not seem to have an important effect on the public's support for reform (e.g. depending on the structure of support for political reforms, Poland and Ukraine are in the same group, while depending on the structure of support for market economy, the Czech Republic and Ukraine belong to the same group).

Differences over time. The results suggest the existence of a process of attitudinal specialization at the mass level. Previous studies have indicated that in the initial stages of the transition people did not distinguish clearly between political and economic reforms. Several years of experiencing the results of different reforms have determined, however, a better understanding of these reforms. This finding contradicts somehow Inglehart's interpretation of changes in political culture as being mainly determined by intergenerational change (Inglehart, 1990).

The lack of significant changes in the structure of mass public support for political reforms suggests that by 1995-97 the attitudes of the people with respect to this issue were already in equilibrium. In the case of market economy there are significant changes over time, showing that people are still developing their attitudes toward market economy. There are also some changes in the attitudes toward welfare state, but it is not clear from the data whether these indicate reaching the equilibrium or that the welfare state is just becoming a salient issue.

What can these results tell about the future of the Central and Eastern European countries? In terms of support for political reform it seems that the publics have crystallized their attitudes and the chances of a significant decline in support for democracy are very small. Support for market economy is influenced by the people's evaluations of how economic reforms are affecting their own economic situations, suggesting that poor economic performance might affect the level of support. At the same time, however, the modernist groups of the society support market economy, and their support has the potential of canceling the effects of short term economic difficulties. The public supports both democracy and market economy and only macro-level factors have the potential for reversal.

APPENDIX A – VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS

Table A-1. Dependent variable – Support for political reform

Factor score from the following items:						
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?						
<i>Item 1 (EVS – v216 / WVS – v154):</i>						
	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad	Dk	Na
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
<i>Item 2 (EVS – v218 / WVS – v156):</i>						
	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad	Dk	Na
Having the army rule the country	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
<i>Item 3 (EVS – v219 / WVS – v157 / the scale was reversed for analysis):</i>						
	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad	Dk	Na
Having a democratic political system ⁴	3	2	1	-1	-2	
I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them?						
<i>Item 4 (EVS – v221 / WVS – v160):</i>						
In democracy, the economic system runs badly	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Dk	Na
	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
<i>Item 5 (EVS – v222 / WVS – v161):</i>						
Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Dk	Na
	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
<i>Item 6 (EVS – v223 / WVS – v162):</i>						
Democracies are not good at maintaining order	Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	Dk	Na
	1	2	3	4	-1	-2

Table A-2. Dependent variables – Support for economic reform

Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?											
<i>DepVar 1 (EVS – v186 / WVS – v127 / the scale was reversed for analysis):</i>											
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	-1	-2
Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves						The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for				Dk	Na
<i>DepVar 2 (EVS – v188 / WVS – v128 / the scale was reversed for analysis):</i>											
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	-1	-2
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas						Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people				Dk	Na
<i>DepVar 3 (EVS – v189 / the scale was reversed for analysis):</i>											
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	-1	-2
The state should give more freedom to firms						The state should control firms more effectively				Dk	Na
<i>DepVar 3 (WVS – v189 / the scale was reversed for analysis):</i>											
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	-1	-2
Private ownership of business and industry should be increased						Government ownership of business and industry should be increased				Dk	Na

Table A-3. Independent variables

Label	Variable
MALE	(EVS – v291 / WVS – v214 / recoded) Gender: 1 – Male / 0 – Female
AGE	(EVS – v292 / WVS – v216) Age: in years
EDUCATION	(EVS – v304) 1 - Inadequately completed elementary education 2 - Completed elementary education 3 - Elementary education and basic vocational qualification 4 - Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification 5 - Secondary, intermediate general qualification 6 - Full secondary, maturity level certificate 7 - Higher education – lower-level tertiary certificate 8 - Higher education – upper-level tertiary certificate

EDUCATION	(WVS – v217) 1 - No formal education 2 - Incomplete primary school 3 - Complete primary school 4 - Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 5 - Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 6 - Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 7 - Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 8 - Some university-level education, without degree 9 - University-level education, with degree
TOWNSIZE	(EVS – v322 / WVS – v232) 1 – Under 2,000 2 – 2,000 – 5,000 3 – 5,000 – 10,000 4 – 10,000 – 20,000 5 – 20,000 – 50,000 6 – 50,000 – 100,000 7 – 100,000 – 500,000 8 – Over 500,000
INCOME	(EVS – v320 / WVS – v227) 10 response categories (deciles) from 1 – Lowest to 10 - Highest.
UNEMPLOYED	(EVS – v306 / WVS – v220 / recoded) Employment status: 1 = Unemployed / 0 = Otherwise.
SAT_LIFE	(EVS – v68 / WVS – v65) All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer. Scale from 1 – Dissatisfied to 10 – Satisfied.
CUR_REGIME	(EVS – v214 / WVS – v152) People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: Scale from 1 – very bad to 10 – very good.
COM_REGIME	(EVS – v215 / WVS – v151) Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was under the communist regime? Scale from 1 – very bad to 10 – very good.
SAT_DEMO	(EVS – v213) On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country? 4 – Very satisfied / 3 – Rather satisfied / 2 – Not very satisfied / 1 – Not at all satisfied.
SAT_DEMO	(WVS – v165) How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? 4 – Very satisfied / 3 – Fairly satisfied / 2 – Fairly dissatisfied / 1 – Very dissatisfied.
POL_ACT	(EVS – v179 to v183 / WVS – v118 to v122 / recoded) Respondent has done any of the following: signing a petition / joining in boycotts / attending lawful demonstrations / joining unofficial strikes / occupying buildings or factories. Additive scale from 0 to 5.

IMP_POL	<p>Factor score from the following items: (EVS – v5 / WVS – v7) How important is politics in your life? 4 – Very important / 3 – Quite important / 2 – Not important / 1 – Not at all important. (EVS – v7 / WVS – v37) When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters: 3 – Frequently / 2 – Occasionally / 1 – Never. (EVS – v263) How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers? 5 – Every day / 4 – Several times a week / 3 – Once or twice a week / 2 – Less often / 1 – Never. (WVS – v117) How interested would you say you are in politics? 4 – Very interested / 3 – Somewhat interested / 2 – Not very interested / 1 – Not at all interested.</p>
LEFT_RIGHT	<p>(EVS – v185 / WVS – v123) In political matters, people talk of `the left' and the `the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? Scale from 1 – Left to 10 – Right.</p>
IND_TRUST	<p>(EVS – v66 / WVS – v27 / recoded) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 1 - Most people can be trusted / 0 - Can't be too careful.</p>
MEMBER	<p>(EVS – v12 to v29 / WVS – v28 to v36 / recoded) Membership in any of the following voluntary organizations: religious or church organisations / education, arts, music or cultural activities / trade unions / political parties or groups / conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights / professional associations / sports or recreation / other. Additive scale ranging from 0 to 8.</p>

APPENDIX B – STATISTICS FOR THE CONSTRUCTED INDEXES

Table B-1. Statistics for the index measuring support for political reform - 1999

Country	Smallest correlation	Highest correlation	Correlation between factors (ML extraction)	Cronbach's alpha	KMO (PCA)	% of explained variance (PCA)
Bulgaria	0.177	0.723	0.466	0.759	0.772	46.963
Croatia	0.171	0.645	0.453	0.731	0.727	43.565
Czech Rep.	0.086	0.563	0.407	0.671	0.733	39.016
Estonia	0.118	0.545	0.570	0.737	0.795	43.697
Latvia	0.094	0.514	0.490	0.679	0.745	39.885
Lithuania	0.130	0.709	0.416	0.696	0.737	41.285
Poland	0.094	0.655	0.383	0.706	0.715	41.476
Romania	0.156	0.585	0.519	0.704	0.744	40.790
Russia	0.115	0.695	0.551	0.759	0.809	48.153
Slovakia	0.150	0.646	0.534	0.784	0.798	49.300
Slovenia	0.101	0.585	0.441	0.692	0.734	40.739
Ukraine	0.147	0.698	0.472	0.742	0.776	45.397

Note: All coefficients are significant at $p < 0.001$.

Table B-2. Statistics for the index measuring support for political reform - 1996

Country	Smallest correlation	Highest correlation	Correlation between factors (ML extraction)	Cronbach's alpha	KMO (PCA)	% of explained variance (PCA)
Bulgaria	0.008	0.751	0.170	0.688	0.778	45.723
Croatia	0.145	0.618	0.475	0.747	0.761	45.356
Czech Rep.	0.088	0.555	0.399	0.673	0.720	39.055
Estonia	0.170	0.609	One factor	0.757	0.801	46.202
Latvia	0.142	0.539	0.532	0.686	0.760	40.079
Lithuania	0.114	0.676	One factor	0.740	0.797	46.149
Poland	-0.012	0.721	One factor	0.655	0.652	54.257
Romania	0.247	0.687	0.566	0.769	0.777	47.642
Russia	0.190	0.713	0.541	0.791	0.831	51.267
Slovakia	0.068	0.646	0.358	0.709	0.739	42.622
Slovenia	0.056	0.609	0.398	0.704	0.737	41.672
Ukraine	0.124	0.703	One factor	0.740	0.792	45.702

Note: All coefficients are significant at $p < 0.001$, excepting those marked with bold fonts.

Table B-3. Statistics for the index measuring importance of politics - 1999

Country	Smallest correlation	Highest correlation	Cronbach's alpha	KMO (PCA)	% of explained variance (PCA)
Bulgaria	0.334	0.429	0.645	0.648	58.489
Croatia	0.373	0.421	0.661	0.658	59.634
Czech Rep.	0.372	0.400	0.650	0.656	58.847
Estonia	0.351	0.417	0.652	0.653	58.978
Latvia	0.281	0.406	0.603	0.628	55.816
Lithuania	0.225	0.456	0.586	0.594	55.063
Poland	0.333	0.456	0.655	0.645	59.242
Romania	0.300	0.485	0.655	0.631	59.351
Russia	0.286	0.412	0.595	0.621	55.372
Slovakia	0.379	0.494	0.703	0.664	62.794
Slovenia	0.302	0.357	0.605	0.638	55.866
Ukraine	0.283	0.428	0.605	0.622	56.030

Note: All coefficients are significant at $p < 0.001$.

Table B-4. Statistics for the index measuring importance of politics - 1996

Country	Smallest correlation	Highest correlation	Cronbach's alpha	KMO (PCA)	% of explained variance (PCA)
Bulgaria	0.405	0.592	0.756	0.664	67.272
Croatia	0.390	0.601	0.748	0.653	66.670
Czech Rep.	0.364	0.573	0.750	0.639	66.808
Estonia	0.426	0.580	0.769	0.668	68.500
Latvia	0.400	0.567	0.754	0.660	67.143
Lithuania	0.440	0.606	0.782	0.669	69.740
Poland	0.489	0.649	0.815	0.678	73.076
Romania	0.363	0.523	0.722	0.656	64.327
Russia	0.415	0.610	0.767	0.660	69.327
Slovakia	0.403	0.566	0.755	0.663	67.252
Slovenia	0.361	0.547	0.733	0.644	65.339
Ukraine	0.421	0.552	0.760	0.672	67.645

Note: All coefficients are significant at $p < 0.001$.

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TABLES

Table 1 Correlations between the dependent variables

	1999			1995-97		
	Political reform / Welfare state	Political reform / Market economy	Welfare state / Market economy	Political reform / Welfare state	Political reform / Market economy	Welfare state / Market economy
Bulgaria	0.35	0.39	0.45	0.27	0.34	0.14
Croatia	0.02 ^{n.s.}	0.13	0.12	0.04 ^{n.s.}	0.19	-0.02 ^{n.s.}
Czech Rep.	0.29	0.33	0.44	0.28	0.29	0.26
Estonia	0.16	0.22	0.34	0.05 ^{n.s.}	0.29	0.17
Latvia	0.18	0.16	0.20	0.12	0.22	0.17
Lithuania	0.12	0.28	0.26	0.21	0.23	0.16
Poland	0.18	0.21	0.25	0.24	0.30	0.48
Romania	0.17	0.39	0.34	0.18	0.33	0.00 ^{n.s.}
Russia	0.18	0.25	0.30	0.23	0.32	0.29
Slovakia	0.26	0.29	0.35	0.11	0.29	0.13
Slovenia	0.19	0.13	0.06 ^{n.s.}	0.17	0.18	0.05 ^{n.s.}
Ukraine	0.22	0.36	0.41	0.13	0.28	0.21

Notes: All coefficients are significant at the 0.001 level, with the exception of the coefficients marked with n.s., which are not significant. Data sources: EVS (1999) and WVS (1995-97).

Table 2 Regression equation for support for political reforms (1999)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM
Male	0.102*	0.042	-0.019	0.069	0.159**	-0.063	0.090	0.062	-0.053	0.044	-0.023	0.099
	(.019)	(.397)	(.741)	(.301)	(.007)	(.299)	(.184)	(.323)	(.137)	(.473)	(.698)	(.092)
Age	-0.007***	0.000	0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.005*	-0.004	-0.004**	-0.002	0.000	-0.004*
	(.000)	(.906)	(.499)	(.345)	(.291)	(.085)	(.041)	(.156)	(.004)	(.221)	(.965)	(.034)
Education	0.092***	0.035*	0.082***	0.066***	0.107***	0.046*	0.054**	0.050*	0.079***	0.056***	0.064***	0.053***
	(.000)	(.021)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)	(.037)	(.010)	(.022)	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)	(.000)
Town size	0.008	-0.023*	-0.002	-0.010	0.041**	-0.039**	0.030*	0.035	0.026***	-0.029**	0.034**	0.001
	(.413)	(.032)	(.839)	(.408)	(.007)	(.003)	(.018)	(.052)	(.001)	(.006)	(.009)	(.922)
Income	-0.001	0.044***	0.006	0.015	0.066***	0.029	0.045*	0.035	-0.003	0.011	0.008	0.015
	(.943)	(.000)	(.704)	(.428)	(.000)	(.057)	(.049)	(.082)	(.704)	(.504)	(.524)	(.242)
Unemployed	-0.142	-0.182*	-0.105	-0.155	-0.017	-0.072	0.034	-0.084	-0.135*	0.068	0.027	-0.190
	(.218)	(.027)	(.296)	(.209)	(.871)	(.541)	(.730)	(.440)	(.021)	(.439)	(.763)	(.075)
Sat_Life	0.013	-0.023	-0.007	0.009	0.004	-0.018	-0.011	-0.002	0.003	0.006	0.005	0.027*
	(.276)	(.069)	(.553)	(.498)	(.799)	(.264)	(.460)	(.870)	(.672)	(.652)	(.677)	(.014)
Cur_Reg	0.051***	0.079***	0.059***	0.002	0.098***	0.078***	0.028	0.034	0.075***	0.065***	0.081***	0.004
	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.914)	(.000)	(.001)	(.219)	(.132)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.789)
Com_Reg	-0.118***	-0.127***	-0.102***	-0.094***	-0.085***	-0.088***	-0.053***	-0.103***	-0.106***	-0.069***	-0.102***	-0.105***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Sat_Dem	0.172***	0.206***	0.193***	0.005	0.069	0.153**	0.161**	0.197***	0.079*	0.131**	0.195***	-0.008
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.938)	(.194)	(.007)	(.004)	(.000)	(.025)	(.004)	(.001)	(.872)
Imp_Pol	0.082***	0.016	0.064*	0.044	0.026	0.034	0.078*	0.022	0.028	-0.001	-0.008	0.124***
	(.000)	(.568)	(.042)	(.220)	(.382)	(.327)	(.025)	(.601)	(.131)	(.987)	(.793)	(.000)
Pol_Part	0.029	0.006	-0.004	0.049	0.059	0.102*	0.093*	-0.037	-0.010	-0.044	0.024	0.026
	(.211)	(.864)	(.900)	(.231)	(.126)	(.044)	(.044)	(.468)	(.714)	(.203)	(.570)	(.655)
Left_Right	0.011	-0.017	-0.010	-0.059*	0.001	0.078***	-0.014	-0.058*	0.049***	0.077***	0.049**	0.025
	(.371)	(.256)	(.494)	(.011)	(.979)	(.000)	(.458)	(.017)	(.000)	(.000)	(.002)	(.102)
Member	-0.002	-0.032	-0.047	0.004	-0.029	-0.069*	-0.044	0.108	-0.014	0.055	-0.039	0.039
	(.909)	(.201)	(.223)	(.906)	(.189)	(.038)	(.279)	(.058)	(.619)	(.172)	(.278)	(.188)
Trust	0.186***	0.007	0.095	0.133	0.334***	0.127	0.181*	0.075	0.024	0.115	0.228***	0.143
	(.000)	(.912)	(.199)	(.080)	(.000)	(.128)	(.029)	(.261)	(.560)	(.057)	(.000)	(.107)
Constant	-0.620***	-0.188	-0.616**	0.113	-1.293***	-0.774**	-0.643*	-0.293	-0.349*	-0.891***	-1.421***	-0.283
	(.001)	(.335)	(.002)	(.676)	(.000)	(.002)	(.011)	(.470)	(.042)	(.000)	(.000)	(.168)
R2	0.300	0.269	0.242	0.097	0.318	0.212	0.121	0.215	0.261	0.262	0.410	0.303
Root MSE	0.867	0.825	0.859	0.974	0.845	0.884	0.929	0.916	0.824	0.872	0.847	0.834
N	1908	1331	1095	1003	1006	1005	1013	1018	2500	1195	1000	1146

Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. White's (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Data source: European Values Survey, 1999.

Table 3 Regression equation for support for political reforms (1995-97)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM
Male	0.097 (.084)	0.024 (.660)	0.100 (.122)	0.058 (.327)	0.136* (.014)	-0.006 (.924)	0.074 (.203)	-0.005 (.937)	-0.032 (.459)	0.034 (.397)	0.028 (.610)	0.167** (.007)
Age	0.002 (.380)	-0.001 (.503)	-0.004 (.054)	-0.003 (.119)	-0.002 (.216)	0.003 (.208)	-0.003 (.194)	-0.002 (.303)	-0.002 (.248)	-0.003 (.053)	0.000 (.818)	-0.007*** (.001)
Education	0.087*** (.000)	0.045** (.005)	0.071*** (.000)	0.235*** (.000)	0.151*** (.000)	0.060*** (.000)	0.102*** (.000)	0.067*** (.000)	0.057*** (.000)	0.075*** (.000)	0.053*** (.000)	0.039* (.016)
Town size	n/a	0.018 (.408)	0.039** (.002)	0.006 (.611)	0.028* (.037)	0.095*** (.000)	0.007 (.455)	0.023* (.050)	0.030*** (.000)	-0.030*** (.000)	0.044*** (.000)	0.068*** (.000)
Income	n/a	n/a	0.00€ (.744)	0.023 (.079)	n/a	0.028 (.058)	0.015 (.217)	0.009 (.559)	0.041*** (.000)	-0.003 (.737)	0.032** (.005)	n/a
Unemployed	0.027 (.869)	-0.174 (.091)	0.137 (.302)	0.102 (.337)	-0.069 (.522)	-0.299* (.017)	-0.108 (.300)	-0.120 (.299)	0.105 (.239)	0.148 (.055)	-0.045 (.595)	-0.218 (.086)
Sat_Life	0.016 (.260)	0.008 (.563)	0.005 (.672)	0.034* (.033)	0.021 (.131)	-0.015 (.341)	0.026 (.075)	0.002 (.892)	0.021* (.018)	0.031** (.008)	-0.004 (.745)	-0.008 (.515)
Cur_Reg	0.105*** (.000)	0.161*** (.000)	0.067*** (.000)	0.034* (.048)	0.114*** (.000)	0.086*** (.000)	0.053*** (.001)	0.083*** (.000)	0.138*** (.000)	0.060*** (.000)	0.132*** (.000)	-0.017 (.489)
Com_Reg	-0.051*** (.001)	-0.046*** (.000)	-0.053*** (.000)	-0.032* (.030)	-0.074*** (.000)	-0.101*** (.000)	-0.102*** (.000)	-0.050*** (.000)	-0.079*** (.000)	-0.050*** (.000)	-0.061*** (.000)	0.080** (.005)
Sat_Dem	0.052 (.224)	0.139*** (.001)	0.104* (.038)	-0.121* (.015)	0.089 (.052)	0.109* (.036)	0.030 (.503)	0.039 (.522)	0.047 (.200)	0.018 (.566)	0.134*** (.001)	0.023 (.645)
Imp_Pol	0.052 (.129)	0.006 (.841)	0.023 (.461)	0.141*** (.000)	0.037 (.230)	0.031 (.361)	0.064 (.053)	0.071* (.047)	0.025 (.307)	0.043 (.061)	0.019 (.541)	0.11€*** (.000)
Pol_Part	-0.009 (.805)	0.025 (.343)	0.075 (.055)	-0.017 (.677)	0.103** (.007)	0.029 (.547)	0.072* (.030)	0.019 (.648)	0.004 (.895)	-0.035 (.235)	0.048 (.336)	-0.040 (.419)
Left_Right	0.008 (.603)	0.011 (.455)	0.026 (.079)	-0.050* (.012)	-0.021 (.251)	0.060* (.014)	0.020 (.335)	0.010 (.590)	0.014 (.334)	0.051*** (.000)	0.035 (.053)	0.044** (.003)
Member	-0.085* (.034)	0.019 (.666)	n/a	-0.087** (.008)	-0.068 (.086)	0.053 (.389)	-0.054 (.262)	0.010 (.896)	-0.023 (.522)	-0.025 (.620)	-0.120 (.056)	-0.092** (.003)
Trust	0.169* (.014)	0.154* (.011)	0.043 (.578)	0.105 (.125)	0.145* (.046)	-0.062 (.397)	0.118* (.049)	0.121 (.143)	0.001 (.988)	0.064 (.129)	0.126* (.043)	0.091 (.194)
Constant	-1.074*** (.000)	-1.195*** (.000)	-1.082*** (.000)	-0.272 (.238)	-1.278*** (.000)	-1.273*** (.000)	-0.883*** (.000)	-0.851** (.002)	-0.854*** (.000)	-0.686*** (.000)	-1.631*** (.000)	-0.778*** (.000)
R2	0.156	0.244	0.170	0.127	0.294	0.218	0.187	0.151	0.266	0.127	0.389	0.143
Root MSE	0.911	0.871	0.895	0.955	0.844	0.900	0.921	0.915	0.829	0.942	0.781	0.932
N	1147	1095	1153	1196	1007	1021	1200	1009	2040	2811	1072	1239

Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, n/a data not available. White's (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Data source: WVS (1995-97).

Table 4 Signs and significances of the coefficients for support for political reforms (1995-97 and 1999)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM	
1999	Male	+			++								
	Age	---					-		--			-	
	Education	+++	+	+++	+++	+++	+	++	+	+++	+++	+++	+++
	Town size		-			++	--	+		+++	--	++	
	Income		+++			+++		+					
	Unemploy		-							-			
	Sat_Life												+
	Cur_Reg	+++	+++	+++		+++	+++			+++	+++	+++	
	Com_Reg	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	Sat_Dem	+++	+++	+++			++	++	+++	+	++	+++	
	Imp_Pol	+++		+				+					+++
	Pol_Part						+	+					
	Left_Right				-		+++		-	+++	+++	++	
	Member						-						
	Trust	+++				+++		+				+++	
Constant	---		--		---	--	-		-	---	---		
1995-97	Male				+							++	
	Age											---	
	Education	+++	++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+
	Town size	n/a		++		+	+++		+	+++	--	+++	+++
	Income	n/a	n/a			n/a				+++		++	n/a
	Unemploy						-						
	Sat_Life				+					+	++		
	Cur_Reg	+++	+++	+++	+	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	
	Com_Reg	---	---	---	-	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	++
	Sat_Dem		+++	+	-		+					+++	
	Imp_Pol				+++				+				+++
	Pol_Part					++		+					
	Left_Right				-		+				+++		++
	Member	-		n/a	--								--
	Trust	+	+			+		+				+	
Constant	---	---	---		---	---	---	--	---	---	---	---	

Note: +++ and --- p < 0.001, ++ and -- p < 0.01, + and - p < 0.05, n/a data not available. The coefficients marked with + are positive, while the coefficients marked with - are negative. Data sources: EVS (1999) and WVS (1995-97).

Table 5 Regression equation for support for market economy (1999)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM
Male	0.558*** (.001)	0.702*** (.001)	0.303 (.285)	0.631* (.034)	0.492 (.066)	0.240 (.376)	0.193 (.392)	0.208 (.476)	0.526** (.004)	1.153*** (.000)	0.874** (.002)	1.016*** (.000)
Age	-0.009 (.087)	-0.013 (.061)	-0.019* (.033)	0.013 (.238)	-0.020* (.012)	-0.016* (.042)	-0.022** (.004)	-0.032*** (.001)	-0.026*** (.000)	-0.052*** (.000)	0.002 (.847)	-0.005 (.538)
Education	0.194*** (.000)	0.186** (.007)	0.149* (.049)	0.236** (.006)	0.202** (.009)	0.105 (.268)	0.184** (.005)	0.113 (.240)	0.126* (.015)	0.292*** (.000)	0.226* (.017)	0.174** (.003)
Town size	0.029 (.423)	0.011 (.816)	-0.011 (.841)	0.051 (.353)	0.093 (.164)	-0.108* (.033)	0.063 (.135)	-0.031 (.681)	-0.025 (.505)	0.063 (.204)	0.034 (.583)	0.049 (.465)
Income	0.057 (.125)	0.027 (.497)	0.290*** (.000)	0.296*** (.000)	0.008 (.893)	0.362*** (.000)	0.185* (.027)	0.285** (.002)	0.114** (.002)	0.183* (.037)	0.079 (.162)	0.187** (.003)
Unemployed	-0.384 (.324)	-1.119*** (.001)	1.153* (.031)	0.373 (.394)	0.301 (.530)	0.242 (.655)	0.404 (.242)	0.136 (.755)	-0.355 (.274)	-0.132 (.791)	-0.432 (.353)	-0.232 (.626)
Sat_Life	0.105* (.033)	0.042 (.384)	0.097 (.101)	-0.046 (.484)	0.053 (.465)	0.085 (.218)	0.122* (.025)	0.193*** (.001)	0.073 (.069)	0.131 (.055)	0.104 (.100)	-0.020 (.680)
Cur_Reg	-0.018 (.742)	-0.106 (.124)	0.038 (.662)	-0.226* (.013)	0.164 (.054)	0.231* (.018)	-0.144 (.098)	-0.026 (.711)	-0.044 (.475)	0.002 (.985)	0.145 (.145)	0.184** (.010)
Com_Reg	-0.219*** (.000)	-0.298*** (.000)	-0.104 (.090)	0.142* (.048)	-0.182** (.004)	-0.229*** (.000)	-0.133* (.018)	-0.149 (.064)	-0.292*** (.000)	-0.199** (.002)	-0.353*** (.000)	-0.358*** (.000)
Sat_Dem	0.842*** (.000)	0.584*** (.002)	0.179 (.443)	0.349 (.167)	0.506* (.039)	0.372 (.131)	0.135 (.531)	0.659** (.002)	0.185 (.222)	-0.014 (.953)	0.759** (.003)	0.151 (.447)
Imp_Pol	0.290** (.002)	0.108 (.330)	0.154 (.308)	0.094 (.556)	-0.129 (.333)	-0.071 (.629)	-0.053 (.686)	-0.127 (.403)	0.128 (.164)	0.100 (.493)	-0.250 (.112)	0.255 (.054)
Pol_Part	-0.130 (.190)	-0.190 (.272)	-0.113 (.509)	-0.083 (.643)	0.063 (.695)	0.543* (.025)	-0.087 (.617)	0.694*** (.000)	0.206 (.114)	0.462* (.016)	0.431* (.027)	0.045 (.848)
Left_Right	0.187*** (.000)	-0.028 (.649)	0.071 (.331)	-0.172 (.086)	0.033 (.718)	-0.075 (.463)	0.029 (.737)	0.109 (.155)	0.265*** (.000)	0.373*** (.000)	0.117 (.188)	-0.070 (.280)
Member	-0.243** (.002)	0.120 (.258)	0.249 (.176)	0.090 (.561)	-0.072 (.521)	0.018 (.912)	-0.596*** (.000)	-0.431* (.037)	-0.060 (.678)	-0.304 (.112)	-0.325 (.135)	0.308* (.034)
Trust	0.710*** (.000)	0.001 (.996)	0.668 (.054)	0.105 (.760)	0.275 (.357)	0.398 (.211)	0.452 (.129)	0.273 (.352)	-0.046 (.821)	1.230*** (.000)	0.177 (.580)	0.353 (.413)
Constant	8.987*** (.000)	11.305*** (.000)	8.993*** (.000)	11.142*** (.000)	11.026*** (.000)	9.260*** (.000)	10.684*** (.000)	10.577*** (.000)	11.324*** (.000)	9.428*** (.000)	8.897*** (.000)	11.090*** (.000)
R2	0.174	0.118	0.087	0.060	0.071	0.144	0.081	0.145	0.133	0.234	0.223	0.218
Root MSE	3.544	3.469	4.288	4.386	3.930	3.923	3.435	4.141	4.255	4.669	4.295	3.987
N	1908	1331	1095	1003	1006	1005	1013	1018	2500	1195	1000	1146

Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. White's (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Data source: European Values Survey, 1999.

Table 6 Regression equation for support for market economy (1995-97)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM
Male	0.315 (.130)	0.209 (.305)	0.834*** (.001)	0.484* (.013)	0.480* (.033)	0.609** (.003)	0.812*** (.000)	0.845*** (.001)	0.271 (.123)	0.799*** (.000)	-0.168 (.458)	-0.025 (.912)
Age	0.001 (.850)	-0.027*** (.001)	-0.009 (.227)	-0.017* (.024)	-0.010 (.160)	-0.033*** (.000)	-0.030*** (.000)	-0.044*** (.000)	-0.052*** (.000)	-0.042*** (.000)	-0.014 (.064)	-0.003 (.720)
Education	0.195** (.002)	0.295*** (.000)	0.377*** (.000)	0.356* (.049)	0.196** (.002)	0.141* (.013)	0.104 (.058)	0.120 (.106)	0.141** (.002)	0.099* (.030)	0.077 (.177)	0.174** (.007)
Town size	n/a	0.172* (.031)	0.159*** (.001)	-0.083* (.042)	0.004 (.940)	0.327*** (.000)	0.029 (.392)	0.007 (.882)	0.068 (.086)	0.006 (.847)	0.002 (.965)	0.181*** (.000)
Income	n/a	n/a	0.104 (.172)	-0.039 (.352)	n/a	0.161** (.002)	0.177*** (.000)	0.132 (.061)	0.160*** (.000)	0.060 (.232)	0.029 (.550)	n/a
Unemployed	0.586 (.221)	-0.163 (.688)	0.066 (.876)	-0.350 (.360)	0.356 (.379)	-0.202 (.671)	-0.608 (.134)	0.108 (.817)	-0.231 (.554)	1.094*** (.000)	-0.064 (.860)	-0.754 (.096)
Sat_Life	0.124* (.044)	-0.038 (.507)	0.047 (.380)	0.079 (.154)	0.081 (.194)	0.010 (.841)	0.174*** (.001)	0.051 (.388)	0.107** (.002)	0.112* (.016)	0.165** (.004)	-0.066 (.212)
Cur_Reg	0.078 (.238)	0.243*** (.000)	0.176* (.011)	0.033 (.595)	0.133 (.057)	0.188** (.003)	0.052 (.389)	0.206** (.006)	0.231*** (.000)	0.276*** (.000)	0.202** (.005)	0.077 (.431)
Com_Reg	-0.351*** (.000)	-0.245*** (.000)	-0.434*** (.000)	-0.392*** (.000)	-0.294*** (.000)	-0.272*** (.000)	-0.286*** (.000)	-0.133* (.039)	-0.322*** (.000)	-0.358*** (.000)	-0.332*** (.000)	-0.031 (.745)
Sat_Dem	0.240 (.171)	0.149 (.349)	0.328 (.092)	-0.297 (.105)	0.033 (.849)	0.015 (.935)	0.099 (.547)	0.451 (.079)	-0.035 (.815)	0.055 (.677)	0.009 (.960)	0.074 (.682)
Imp_Pol	0.323** (.004)	0.248* (.037)	0.391** (.004)	0.144 (.170)	0.172 (.161)	0.214 (.065)	0.258* (.025)	0.101 (.510)	0.151 (.109)	0.110 (.247)	0.198 (.098)	0.331** (.005)
Pol_Part	-0.029 (.851)	0.215* (.046)	0.134 (.373)	0.141 (.309)	-0.005 (.972)	0.308* (.039)	-0.023 (.854)	0.116 (.526)	0.308* (.028)	0.183 (.124)	0.325 (.078)	0.229 (.226)
Left_Right	0.306*** (.000)	0.067 (.246)	-0.109 (.078)	0.001 (.984)	-0.036 (.630)	0.119* (.050)	0.204** (.009)	0.415*** (.000)	0.069 (.155)	0.168** (.005)	0.182* (.012)	0.353*** (.000)
Member	0.061 (.682)	-0.062 (.737)	n/a	-0.022 (.860)	-0.010 (.943)	0.159 (.381)	0.006 (.970)	-0.633 (.051)	-0.140 (.356)	-0.226 (.286)	0.034 (.900)	-0.519** (.002)
Trust	0.204 (.366)	0.031 (.914)	0.032 (.923)	-0.125 (.555)	-0.045 (.883)	0.253 (.302)	0.310 (.196)	0.238 (.422)	0.024 (.904)	0.445** (.010)	-0.051 (.848)	0.061 (.844)
Constant	10.066*** (.000)	10.898*** (.000)	9.098*** (.000)	17.565*** (.000)	13.626*** (.000)	11.468*** (.000)	11.340*** (.000)	9.597*** (.000)	11.656*** (.000)	12.211*** (.000)	11.838*** (.000)	11.468*** (.000)
R2	0.198	0.182	0.246	0.097	0.088	0.207	0.183	0.186	0.233	0.182	0.228	0.103
Root MSE	3.328	3.380	3.822	3.230	3.420	3.153	3.389	3.917	3.609	4.119	3.411	3.807
N	1147	1095	1153	1196	1007	1021	1200	1009	2040	2811	1072	1239

Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, n/a data not available. White's (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Data source: WVS (1995-97).

Table 7 Signs and significances of the coefficients for support for market economy (1995-97 and 1999)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM	
1999	Male	+++	+++		+				++	+++	++	+++	
	Age			-		-	--	---	---	---			
	Education	+++	++	+	++	++		++	+	+++	+	--	
	Town size						-						
	Income			+++	+++		+++	+	++	++	+		++
	Unemploy		---	+									
	Sat_Life	+						+	+++				
	Cur_Reg				-		+						++
	Com_Reg	---	---		+	--	---	-		---	--	---	---
	Sat_Dem	+++	+++			+			++			++	
	Imp_Pol	++											
	Pol_Part						+		+++		+	+	
	Left_Right	+++								+++	+++		
	Member	--						---	-				+
	Trust	+++									+++		
	Constant	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++
1995-97	Male			+++	+	+	++	+++	+++	+++			
	Age		---		-		---	---	---	---			
	Education	++	+++	+++	+	++	+		++	+		++	
	Town size	n/a	+	+++	-		+++					+++	
	Income	n/a	n/a			n/a	++	+++		+++		n/a	
	Unemploy									+++			
	Sat_Life	+						+++	++	+	++		
	Cur_Reg		+++	+			++		++	+++	+++	++	
	Com_Reg	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	-	---	---	---	
	Sat_Dem												
	Imp_Pol	++	+	++				+				++	
	Pol_Part		+				+			+			
	Left_Right	+++					+	++	+++		++	+	+++
	Member			n/a									--
	Trust										++		
	Constant	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++

Note: +++ and --- p < 0.001, ++ and - p < 0.01, + and - p < 0.05, n/a data not available. The coefficients marked with + are positive, while the coefficients marked with - are negative. Data sources: EVS (1999) and WVS (1995-97).

Table 8 Regression equation for support for welfare state (1999)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM
Male	-0.014 (.900)	0.187 (.185)	0.012 (.944)	0.100 (.630)	0.194 (.257)	-0.032 (.829)	0.050 (.767)	0.278 (.114)	0.214 (.067)	0.458** (.009)	0.342* (.047)	0.408* (.041)
Age	0.004 (.323)	-0.003 (.510)	0.010 (.066)	-0.008 (.258)	-0.006 (.315)	-0.003 (.538)	-0.005 (.424)	-0.002 (.711)	-0.008* (.037)	-0.009 (.122)	0.007 (.280)	0.004 (.494)
Education	0.085** (.004)	0.110* (.020)	0.130** (.002)	-0.007 (.904)	0.262*** (.000)	0.060 (.256)	0.069 (.138)	-0.073 (.195)	0.055 (.091)	0.024 (.568)	0.208*** (.000)	0.146*** (.001)
Town size	-0.050* (.042)	0.028 (.389)	-0.092** (.003)	0.068 (.065)	-0.060 (.150)	-0.098*** (.001)	0.016 (.638)	-0.004 (.938)	-0.049* (.030)	0.009 (.771)	-0.088* (.020)	-0.077 (.121)
Income	0.089*** (.000)	0.084** (.005)	0.152** (.002)	0.118* (.028)	0.073 (.159)	0.190*** (.000)	0.085 (.163)	0.243*** (.000)	0.068** (.004)	0.140* (.012)	0.054 (.095)	0.102* (.024)
Unemployed	-0.056 (.859)	-0.316 (.146)	0.222 (.440)	0.047 (.883)	-0.207 (.525)	-0.092 (.755)	-0.437 (.085)	0.242 (.352)	-0.274 (.197)	0.006 (.984)	-0.213 (.414)	-0.029 (.938)
Sat_Life	0.088** (.007)	0.025 (.475)	0.038 (.285)	0.002 (.970)	0.032 (.432)	0.118** (.002)	0.068 (.102)	0.141*** (.000)	0.115*** (.000)	0.141*** (.000)	0.133*** (.000)	0.118** (.005)
Cur_Reg	0.036 (.315)	0.046 (.349)	0.094 (.066)	0.254*** (.000)	0.067 (.226)	0.198*** (.000)	0.009 (.869)	0.058 (.252)	0.081* (.040)	-0.038 (.514)	0.130* (.032)	0.172*** (.001)
Com_Reg	-0.210*** (.000)	-0.212*** (.000)	-0.082* (.032)	-0.024 (.642)	-0.023 (.571)	-0.133*** (.000)	-0.149*** (.000)	-0.094* (.018)	-0.133*** (.000)	-0.082 (.052)	-0.200*** (.000)	-0.058 (.113)
Sat_Dem	0.280** (.005)	0.266* (.027)	0.330* (.014)	0.202 (.265)	0.324* (.036)	0.209 (.104)	0.496*** (.001)	0.362** (.007)	0.092 (.369)	0.241 (.086)	0.148 (.333)	-0.198 (.209)
Imp_Pol	0.168** (.008)	-0.085 (.287)	-0.011 (.910)	0.083 (.450)	-0.018 (.848)	0.155 (.053)	-0.011 (.900)	-0.137 (.162)	-0.025 (.682)	-0.033 (.700)	-0.154 (.107)	0.027 (.791)
Pol_Part	-0.011 (.841)	0.027 (.785)	0.076 (.412)	-0.153 (.163)	-0.168 (.103)	0.392*** (.001)	0.088 (.504)	0.132 (.284)	0.002 (.982)	0.114 (.378)	0.289* (.020)	0.182 (.280)
Left_Right	0.103** (.002)	-0.022 (.590)	-0.061 (.207)	0.044 (.502)	0.061 (.283)	-0.097 (.071)	-0.021 (.703)	0.069 (.223)	0.105* (.012)	0.123* (.034)	-0.021 (.684)	0.092 (.126)
Member	-0.054 (.324)	-0.029 (.684)	0.134 (.235)	-0.049 (.618)	0.022 (.763)	0.055 (.539)	-0.086 (.463)	-0.245 (.091)	-0.199* (.029)	0.028 (.811)	-0.181 (.083)	-0.297 (.084)
Trust	0.159 (.204)	0.294 (.141)	0.190 (.334)	0.503* (.039)	0.188 (.377)	0.293 (.093)	0.111 (.618)	0.347 (.080)	0.111 (.416)	0.257 (.207)	0.013 (.947)	-0.007 (.983)
Constant	4.151*** (.000)	3.983*** (.000)	3.268*** (.000)	3.994*** (.000)	1.832** (.006)	3.238*** (.000)	3.141*** (.000)	3.210*** (.000)	4.556*** (.000)	3.153*** (.000)	3.787*** (.000)	3.820*** (.000)
R2	0.158	0.111	0.080	0.058	0.090	0.189	0.072	0.122	0.089	0.108	0.176	0.096
Root MSE	2.361	2.465	2.522	3.045	2.549	2.185	2.582	2.666	2.780	2.839	2.616	3.078
N	1908	1331	1095	1003	1006	1005	1013	1018	2500	1195	1000	1146

Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. White's (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Data source: European Values Survey, 1999.

Table 9 Regression equation for support for welfare state (1995-97)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM
Male	0.353*	-0.062	0.173	0.051	0.576***	0.476**	0.431**	0.098	-0.104	0.315**	0.032	0.207
	(.016)	(.672)	(.311)	(.706)	(.001)	(.002)	(.003)	(.558)	(.383)	(.004)	(.847)	(.250)
Age	-0.005	-0.014**	-0.005	0.000	0.005	-0.013*	-0.012*	-0.014*	-0.023***	-0.016***	0.005	-0.017**
	(.346)	(.006)	(.350)	(.996)	(.319)	(.012)	(.020)	(.024)	(.000)	(.000)	(.404)	(.003)
Education	0.140***	0.126**	0.284***	0.308**	0.192***	0.088*	0.134***	0.109*	-0.020	0.036	0.105*	0.003
	(.001)	(.006)	(.000)	(.009)	(.000)	(.025)	(.001)	(.017)	(.510)	(.199)	(.030)	(.949)
Town size	n/a	0.016	0.034	-0.009	0.014	0.075	-0.033	0.099**	0.077**	0.063***	-0.088*	-0.040
		(.790)	(.297)	(.737)	(.725)	(.281)	(.186)	(.002)	(.002)	(.001)	(.016)	(.251)
Income	n/a	n/a	0.091	0.126***	n/a	0.040	0.013	0.161***	0.040	-0.010	0.163***	n/a
			(.080)	(.000)		(.304)	(.669)	(.000)	(.156)	(.705)	(.000)	
Unemployed	-0.227	-0.250	-0.073	-0.297	-0.416	0.026	-0.315	0.095	0.057	-0.328	-0.004	-0.335
	(.546)	(.330)	(.822)	(.178)	(.161)	(.931)	(.206)	(.728)	(.828)	(.125)	(.990)	(.386)
Sat_Life	0.099**	0.064	0.034	-0.051	0.068	0.150***	0.121**	0.096**	0.124***	0.096***	0.106*	0.124**
	(.009)	(.066)	(.379)	(.145)	(.112)	(.000)	(.002)	(.009)	(.000)	(.000)	(.012)	(.002)
Cur_Reg	0.151***	0.121**	0.138**	-0.049	0.113*	0.106*	0.076	0.191***	0.179***	0.149***	0.065	-0.047
	(.001)	(.002)	(.003)	(.216)	(.033)	(.021)	(.086)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.192)	(.517)
Com_Reg	-0.039	-0.027	-0.171***	-0.085*	-0.117**	-0.055	-0.074*	-0.033	-0.100***	-0.093***	-0.106**	0.215**
	(.270)	(.394)	(.000)	(.011)	(.007)	(.111)	(.037)	(.377)	(.000)	(.000)	(.003)	(.004)
Sat_Dem	-0.037	0.206*	0.036	0.097	0.214	0.140	0.274*	0.119	-0.039	0.169*	0.119	-0.166
	(.733)	(.049)	(.810)	(.387)	(.094)	(.299)	(.016)	(.416)	(.718)	(.046)	(.387)	(.187)
Imp_Pol	0.164*	0.151	0.134	0.071	0.114	0.098	0.090	0.092	-0.010	0.170**	0.173	0.109
	(.039)	(.058)	(.141)	(.298)	(.199)	(.250)	(.261)	(.298)	(.870)	(.003)	(.059)	(.239)
Pol_Part	0.219*	-0.072	0.074	-0.025	-0.010	0.080	0.009	0.024	0.047	0.058	0.023	-0.130
	(.011)	(.361)	(.498)	(.810)	(.933)	(.522)	(.919)	(.834)	(.622)	(.469)	(.869)	(.250)
Left_Right	0.327***	0.070	-0.039	0.045	0.019	0.149**	0.059	0.040	0.053	0.059*	0.041	0.161**
	(.000)	(.074)	(.420)	(.294)	(.775)	(.003)	(.271)	(.419)	(.262)	(.023)	(.405)	(.002)
Member	-0.097	0.253*	n/a	0.242*	-0.138	-0.287	-0.132	0.043	-0.125	0.003	-0.415*	-0.126
	(.371)	(.046)		(.016)	(.223)	(.052)	(.338)	(.830)	(.264)	(.980)	(.020)	(.224)
Trust	0.305	-0.095	0.052	0.135	0.280	0.148	-0.144	0.429*	-0.160	-0.053	-0.107	-0.104
	(.071)	(.579)	(.816)	(.382)	(.218)	(.438)	(.375)	(.025)	(.219)	(.615)	(.555)	(.649)
Constant	0.614	1.957***	3.448***	2.407***	1.914**	1.172	2.091***	1.109	3.828***	2.592***	2.392***	4.065***
	(.210)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.006)	(.063)	(.001)	(.131)	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.000)
R2	0.218	0.091	0.149	0.071	0.085	0.136	0.085	0.168	0.110	0.093	0.124	0.058
Root MSE	2.354	2.356	2.677	2.225	2.613	2.330	2.428	2.490	2.515	2.528	2.484	2.965
N	1147	1095	1153	1196	1007	1021	1200	1009	2040	2811	1072	1239

Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, n/a data not available. White's (robust) standard errors are in parentheses. Data source: WVS (1995-97).

Table 10 Signs and significances of the coefficients for support for welfare state (1995-97 and 1999)

	CZE	SLK	POL	CRO	SLO	EST	LAT	LIT	RUS	UKR	BUL	ROM	
1999	Male									++	+	+	
	Age								-				
	Education	++	+	++		+++					+++	+++	
	Town size	-		--			---		-		-		
	Income	+++	++	++	+		+++		+++	++	+		+
	Unemploy												
	Sat_Life	++					++		+++	+++	+++	+++	++
	Cur_Reg				+++		+++			+		+	+++
	Com_Reg	---	---	-			---	---	-	---		---	
	Sat_Dem	++	+	+		+		+++	++				
	Imp_Pol	++											
	Pol_Part						+++					+	
	Left_Right	++								+	+		
	Member									-			
	Trust				+								
	Constant	+++	+++	+++	+++	++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++
1995-97	Male	+				+++	++	++		++			
	Age		--				-	-	-	---	---	--	
	Education	+++	++	+++	++	+++	+	+++	+		+		
	Town size	n/a							++	++	+++	-	
	Income	n/a	n/a		+++	n/a			+++			+++	n/a
	Unemploy												
	Sat_Life	++					+++	++	++	+++	+++	+	++
	Cur_Reg	+++	++	++		+	+		+++	+++	+++		
	Com_Reg			---	-	--		-		---	---	--	++
	Sat_Dem		+					+			+		
	Imp_Pol	+									++		
	Pol_Part	+											
	Left_Right	+++					++				+		++
	Member		+	n/a	+							-	
	Trust								+				
	Constant		+++	+++	+++	++		+++		+++	+++	+++	+++

Note: +++ and --- p < 0.001, ++ and - p < 0.01, + and - p < 0.05, n/a data not available. The coefficients marked with + are positive, while the coefficients marked with - are negative. Data sources: EVS (1999) and WVS (1995-97).